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DEC 1966

SECURITY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. PHYSICAL SECURITY:

1. A thorough physical security survey of the compound should be completed within the next 30 days. Special care should be placed on the following:

a. Guards: There are two guard posts protecting the compound perimeter. When positioned in the guard shacks, a considerable portion of the compound wall and sides of the buildings are out of the guard's line of sight. This matter should be explored with [redacted] to determine whether a roving guard, preferably inside the compound but outside the buildings themselves could not be added. In certain areas, another solution to the problem could lie in the selective use of alarms.

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b. Lighting: Lights should be installed over all doors leading into the compound buildings as now exist on door 47. None are in place over doors 45, 57, 58 and 71.

c. Doors: All doors should be closely inspected for weak points, especially in the frame areas around the locks. Door 57 is currently in bad shape in this regard which facilitates entry of blades to manipulate beveled locks. Door 71 (rolling hung doors leading to the supply room) is a special problem. The door now can be picked up and off the track with little effort providing sufficient space to squeeze into the supply room. Bar and bracket arrangements or well placed dead bolts may be a simple solution. Of additional concern is that these doors are out of guard's line of sight and not directly lighted.

d. Door Hinges: All door hinge pins now in use are topped and bottomed with screw caps. The inner core can then be pulled/pushed out with any simple instrument as, for example, a nail. Current hinge cores can be retained if tops and bottoms are welded or new hinge covers could be replaced with smooth capped stems, blunted on the bottom.

e. Door Locks: All yale or rabbit beveled locks should be replaced with squared bolt locks. Door lock number 57, for example, has sufficient space in the current frame so that a hook blade can be inserted and the beveled bolt manipulated to gain access. The air conditioning room with one door and several windows is not secured!! This room abuts the Comm Maintenance shop which also has a beveled lock arrangement again with sufficient space to insert an implement to manipulate the bolt and gain access.

f. Door Alarms: Once past the guard point leading into the parking area after hours, access to the hangar inner office and shop areas is through one door set into the hangar door. If the guard on duty is making an inner office check, all doors should be locked. A bell or

buzzer system should be installed in the door in question to alert the guard that someone has arrived.

g. Ducts and Other Openings: As a routine part of the physical security inspection, the heating/cooling ducts should be traced. The drainage ditch grate into the compound should be checked periodically. The four openings at the extreme top corners of the hangar should be solidly screened. Access to the hangar roof is accomplished simply by walking up the steps from the ground level. Once on the roof, access to the four openings in question is tricky but not unmaneuverable and a rope descent, again tricky, is possible. A minor side benefit to blocking off these openings is the reduction of bird traffic into the hangar.

h. In order to allow more expeditious securing of pertinent records at the time indications are received that a vehicle is in trouble, a procedure should be established whereby the Security Officer is one of the first to be informed. In the 384 accident, over an hour elapsed between the time [redacted] indicated engine stoppage and the time the Security Officer was notified.

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i. The PE area was afforded close examination. It is recommended that the following actions be taken to provide additional protection to this area.

(1) Install either top and bottom dead bolts or a bracket and bar arrangement on the inside of doors 22 (pre-breathing room), 27 [redacted] office) and 30 (PE office). Check sheets should be placed on the inside of each door to insure proper locking upon completion of the work day. All PE personnel would then exit through door 26 (kit room). This door should have its' current rabbit lock with bevelled bolt replaced preferably by a 3 way S&G combination lock. Dissemination of this combination should be by the Security Officer on a strict need to have basis. A sign-in/sign-out sheet should be placed on the outside of door 26 and initialed each time it is opened and closed.

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KEY CONTROL

(2) Various liquids are now maintained in an unlockable refrigerator located in the PE wash room. A secure locking device, with keys disseminated on a controlled basis, should be installed. Some of the juices used by the drivers are purchased in bottles with replaceable caps. Individual, one-time-use-only cans should be used in the future. Water should not be stored in the refrigerator for use by the drivers prior to a flight. If a drink is desired, fresh water should be drawn.

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(3) The tube food used by the drivers in flight are maintained in a push button key lock filing cabinet. This method of storing should be altered so as to have the filing cabinet fitted with a bar and hasp arrangement secured with a 3 way S&G combination padlock or, preferably, have the food stored in an approved safe.

(4) With regard to the seat pack, pilot suits, helmets, face plates and oxygen supplies, it is difficult to see how these items could be tampered with to the sophisticated extent that they would pass all of the rigorous pre-flight tests and yet fail after launch. Chutes are visually checked every 10 days and so noted. If a chute requires re-packing, this is done by [redacted] loft. It is known that the chute comes from the [redacted] Re-packing of the chutes in this manner could be considered a weak point inasmuch as we would prefer to have cleared U.S. Nationals performing this function. I have no suggestions to make in this area unless someone were to consider it worthwhile to have one of our men at the Detachment trained and qualified to perform this function. To digress a bit, I don't feel that chutes are really of prime concern from the viewpoint of sabotage. Certainly the re-packing of a chute or a hypodermic needle of acid into the pack prior to flight could destroy the chute from deploying. However, this would almost have to presuppose that the vehicle is going to fail necessitating ejection by the pilot. Thus, some way would have to be devised to make the plane fail in flight and we would have, in effect, a double act of sabotage. I don't think this is realistic.

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[redacted] pack
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(5) At least on all operational flights and perhaps on all flights which will take the pilot some distance over water, personal control of the pilot by a Security Staff Employee should begin on the pilot's awakening on the day of the mission. This is not to act as a bodyguard for the pilot but rather to act as a recorder of all food and liquids ingested and samples obtained, placed in appropriate containers and stored in the locked refrigerator until the safe return of the pilot. It is recognized, of course, that many of the recommendations made here have been made pre-supposing a [redacted] launch and will not be applicable at all launch areas. However, it is hoped that what is being attempted by this type of analysis, admittedly not all-encompassing, will meet with the approval of those most directly involved with a similar security concern then translated into our other staging areas, i.e., [redacted]

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II. PERSONNEL SECURITY:

1. I would strongly recommend a polygraph examination of all [redacted] guards used at Detachment "H" and all remaining [redacted] personnel with free access to the compound who have not been previously polygraphed. The latter would include the snack bar attendent, the supply sergeant, weather officer and his assistant, two PE sergeants, security officer and building maintenance officer.

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2. The issue of polygraphing all Tech Reps prior to leaving the U.S.A. for assignment [redacted] is, I suspect, a delicate one. I would like to see this done. If the political pressures are such so as to preclude this, I recommend that when an accident involving loss of pilot or plane occurs, we polygraph all personnel who had "access" to the vehicle prior to launch. "Access" is admittedly difficult to define,

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but the identification of personnel in a position to sabotage the pilot or the plane can be accomplished, I feel, by the detachment Manager and his staff.

3. I am not convinced in my own mind that we are fully aware of what investigative standards are used by [redacted] in screening their own people. I recommend we ascertain this and solicit [redacted] assistance in doing so if necessary. The criteria should be examined and a determination made as to the overall adequacy of the investigation. Further, I think we should attempt to find out what, if any, re-investigation program is in effect by [redacted] In brief, are we satisfied that the [redacted] are doing enough from their end? Within reasonable limits, could more be done?

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4. I understand that the Detachment Security Officer, within the last year or so, has set up files on all Tech Reps assigned here. I think this is good and inputs therein should be increased. The Security Officer cannot be expected to know everything about everybody, although a continuing effort should be made to mingle with the troops to gain those insights into their backgrounds, habits, attitudes, etc which then become so vitally important when a 384 accident occurs. Without in any way advocating a "submarine system", I think that the Detachment Manager and his Executive Officer could give a major assist in this regard. Liaison with [redacted] of OSI (ID-Ph. III cleared) should be frequent to pick his brain concerning our people's activities and associations [redacted] I see no reason why a specific lead we might want checked out couldn't be handed to him. Is discreet liaison with the Station Security Officer [redacted] in effect? I imagine he could be useful in giving us a feel for what's going on. Does [redacted] give us anything? Through [redacted] wouldn't the observations of the [redacted] Security Officer and his assistant be of value? The whole point, simply, is that we do have some very real assets on this island to help us do our job. Are we using these assets to the fullest extent possible? This whole area of personnel security is a delicate one and must be handled with utmost care and discretion. However, as indicated quite forcibly by both [redacted] in connection with 384, it is a critical area which will be spotlighted and subject to intensified analysis should further accidents occur

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Apropos

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[redacted]

Reviewed in detail w/ Det Mgr & Exec. Officer Page 4 Pres - Concurred in fully w/ exception of poly of people when accident occurs.